Vandalism-militancy relationship:the influence of risk perception and moral disengagement by Mafimisebi, Oluwasoye Patrick & Thorne, Sara
Mafimisebi and Thorne: Vandalism-Militancy Relationship 
1 
Vandalism-Militancy Relationship: The Influence of Risk Perception and Moral 
Disengagement 
Oluwasoye P. Mafimisebi 
and 
Sara Thorne 
Department of Strategy, Enterprise & Innovation 
Portsmouth Business School 
University of Portsmouth 
Portsmouth, UK 
Email: oluwasoye.mafimisebi@myport.ac.uk 
Risk perception and moral disengagement underpin crisis intensification and influence risk 
behaviours. After arguing about the crucial significance of the influence of risk perception and 
moral disengagement in addressing vandalism and militancy crisis, we provide conceptual 
clarification of moral disengagement, moral evaluation and social trust. The research clarifies 
the influence and implication of risk perception and moral disengagement in crisis 
management within the context of vandalism and militant incidents. Specifically, this study 
suggests that there are potential gains in crisis management if strategic options are anchored 
on crisis dimension, morality issues and risk perception. In fact, the study found that people 
are more likely to disengage from moral conducts and even become skilled at neutralising 
morally questionable behaviours and activities when the mechanisms of moral evaluation and 
disengagement routinely operate in them. 
The research findings indicate that environmental risks are perceived to be more important 
than economic or biological risks and that individuals’ susceptible to moral disengagement 
are not predestined to delinquency. Findings attest to environmental victimisation, moralistic 
punishment, and moral surveillance as active factors which risk and crisis leaders must 
address. The study advanced crisis management literature through analyses of moral 
disengagement implications in crisis situations and provides empirical evidence that errors in 
risk perception evaluation can lead to ineffective crisis response and application of failing 
strategic option when managing crisis. Furthermore, the research also establishes that 
conventional wisdom which suggests that vandals and militants are inhumane, and that 
capturing or alienating them will help prevent or reduce future crisis/disaster is ineffective and 
unsustainable. The implications and limitations of these findings are discussed. 
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1. Introduction
Over a decade, vandalism and militancy within the Nigerian oil and gas sector have 
increasingly become focal areas for attention both in the national and global context (for 
example, Ikelegbe 2005; Inokoba and Imbua 2010; Mafimisebi and Nkwunonwo 2015; 
Nkwunonwo and Mafimisebi 2013; Okoli 2013). More recently, Nigerian media and 
researchers have devoted wide coverage to the economic, environmental and human rights 
implications of vandalism and militancy in the Niger Delta region, Nigeria. In clear terms, a 
total of 16,083 pipeline breaks were recorded within the last 10 years (vandals accounted for 
97.5 percent representing 15,685 breaks and 2.5 percent about 398 cases of vandalism were 
due to ruptures) (Ogbeni 2012). The Nigerian government reportedly lost around N500 billion 
on account of restiveness and militancy in 2006 alone. The scourge became worse in 2008 with 
an estimated US$6.3 billion in oil stolen and another US$28 billion worth of oil through a 
deliberate decision was not produce (Duggan 2009) as well as an estimated US$40 million 
revenue lost per day in 2008 (Ubhenin 2013; Ubhenin and Aiya 2010). As contained in the 
2013 annual report of the Nigerian Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (NEITI), 
Nigeria lost US$10 billion to oil theft between 2009 and 2011 due to the crisis (NEITI 2013). 
The Nigeria National Petroleum Company (NNPC) alone lost about N165 billion to products 
theft and repairs of vandalised pipelines between 2009 and 2012 (Ugwuanyi 2013). Likewise, 
crude oil production in Nigeria decreased slightly from 2.13 million bbl/d in 2011 to 2.10 
million bbl/d in 2012 (US, Energy Information Administration, 2013). Lately, on the 30th 
October 2014, the Nigerian federal government disclosed that 80 percent of the country’s 5,120 
kilometres pipelines network for petroleum product distribution have been vandalised (Eboh 
and Ejoh 2014). This further shows the scale of the problem and the need to pragmatically 
address and find sustainable solutions to the crisis.  
In this research, we discuss the question whether risk perception and moral disengagement 
mechanisms influence vandalism and militancy (terrorism) or at least provide innovative and 
useful alternatives and additional strategies to manage unconventional cases of mass 
emergencies and disasters. These are issues or concerns less obvious (or perhaps obscure) but 
pertinent to the theorising of crisis and disaster management response to vandalism and 
militancy (terrorism) phenomena where there are reasons to understand what motivate vandals 
and militants (terrorists) to involve in delinquency in Nigeria. These critical issues or concerns 
become controversially open when we discuss them in the context of risk perception and moral 
disengagement. Closely linked to this discussion, our research findings indicate that 
environmental risks are perceived to be more important than economic or biological risks and 
that individuals’ susceptible to moral disengagement are not predestined to delinquency. 
Whereas individuals susceptible to moral delinquency may be capable of penetrating 
inhumane conducts and heinous acts such as vandalism and militancy, the less vulnerable 
Mafimisebi and Thorne: Vandalism-Militancy Relationship 
3 
responders (leaders) tasked to manage the outcomes are equally susceptible to inhumane 
conducts through mechanisms of moral disengagement. With consideration of this moral 
disengagement theory when managing cases of crises and disasters, the unanticipated 
consequences of crisis intensification and unrealistic expectations that vandals and militants 
will behave humanely can be avoided and effectively manage. However, it should be 
acknowledged that the nature of hazards and disasters discuss here is relative to human-induced 
disasters (vandalism, militancy or terrorism, and technological disaster) but related to other 
types of hazards and disasters (e.g. natural hazard/climate change consequences). The 
behavioural involvement and engagement (or disengagement) dominant within the nature of 
hazards and disasters discuss in this research makes the research findings easier to be generalize 
to wider hazard and disaster management literature. 
Another aspect that is an important consideration in this debate is that, organisations within 
the region were compelled to include an ‘escalation factor’ – called the ‘Niger Delta premium’ 
in their contract bids covering community expectations, vandalism, militancy and kidnaps, and 
higher insurance premiums (Ubhenin 2013). Despite the proclamation of amnesty in the Niger-
Delta on 25 June 2009, intended to encourage militants in the Niger Delta to abandon violence, 
current literatures (for example, Mafimisebi and Nkwunonwo 2014; Mafimisebi and Thorne 
2015; Okoli and Orinya 2013; Ubhenin 2013; Ubhenin and Aiya 2010; Ugwuanyi 2013) 
indicate vandalism and militancy are now worse than during the pre-amnesty era. Oil theft, oil 
bunkering, kidnapping and oil terrorism, and other criminal activities are disconcertingly 
continuing to be perpetuated by the same ex-militants (including other disgruntled youths and 
some corrupt government officials) at an exponential rate. Unsurprisingly, the amnesty has 
been categorised as ‘unfinished business’ (Ubhenin 2013) and a ‘gilded pacification 
campaign’. In the critical context, the government amnesty in the Niger Delta could be argued 
to have gained very limited, if any, success. The series of militants’ attacks on oil facilities and 
state assets have been curtailed. Nevertheless, the post-amnesty period has witnessed severe 
conditions of lawlessness such as abductions, murders, militancy, oil terrorism, delinquent 
gangs, intra-communal violence over oil disputes, and in some cases, state oppression. It is 
paradoxical rather than addressing the root cause; the amnesty program was designed to address 
a narrow problem that of militancy against oil facilities and state assets.  
The International Oil Companies (IOCs) frequently declare force majeure on oil shipments 
because of the crisis. Although vandalism and militancy as such are not new phenomena, 
existing studies confirmed that the intensification of vandalism and militancy within the oil and 
gas sector in Nigeria represent huge national economics loss, environmental degradation, 
disasters and threaten public safety and sustainable development. Empirical studies (Inokoba 
and Imbua 2010; Mafimisebi and Ogbonna 2016; Mafimisebi and Thorne 2015; Okoli and 
Orinya 2013; Omeje 2004; Onuoha 2009) have usually linked the phenomenon of pipeline 
vandalism to another problem concerning mounting militancy in the Niger Delta region, 
Nigeria. Critically, practitioners and academics still contend with the scourge of militancy as 
to whether it is terrorism, a liberation struggle or criminality. More specifically, the Niger Delta 
crisis revolves around oil revenues, greater control of oil resources, environmental degradation 
and pollution associated with crude oil exploitation by the IOCs. In context, little is known 
about the risk perception and the moral disengagement role in such discourse. Therefore the 
case of Niger Delta region was presented in the following section to introduce the research 
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context. In the next sections, we review salient constructs (moral disengagement, moral 
evaluation, and social trust) related to delinquency, and state the research questions. Even more 
critical to these considerations, the relevance of these concepts (moral disengagement, moral 
evaluation and social trust) to crisis and disaster management involving cases of environmental 
risks, terrorism (militancy) and unethical responses to delinquency are imperative for 
sustainable crisis and disaster management practice. The pursuit of this line of inquiry is 
justified by the fact that, with respect to variables identified in risk and disaster research, moral 
psychology and risk behaviours research has both supported their potential to influence crisis 
intensification and decisions (Bandura 2002; Beu and Bucley 2004; Caprara et al. 2006; 
Carlton and Jacobson 2013; Cesarz, Morrision, and Cooke 2003; Chugh et al. 2014; 
Mafimisebi 2013; Mafimisebi and Thorne 2015), and identified mechanisms of moral 
disengagement and several risk perception variables capable of influencing this process. This 
provides avenues to discuss the hypothesis development and operationalization of the research 
concepts in the subsequent sections. Finally, we discuss the methods, findings, general 
discussion and conclusion. 
2. The Niger Delta Region: In Perspective
The Niger Delta region (located within Southern Nigeria) with an area of about 112,000km2 
in landmass, is the home to over 35 million people who live in around 15,000 indigenous 
communities, mainly farmers and coastal fishermen belonging to over 50 ethnic groups. In 
clear context, the Niger Delta is an area the size of England or Portugal (Mafimisebi 2013, p. 
17). The region has an estimated 40 billion barrels in oil reserves and it is home to Africa’s and 
the world’s third largest mangroves. The strategic importance of the Niger Delta to global 
energy equation and national economic survival is crucial. For example, Nigeria currently earns 
more than US$3billion per month from oil in the Niger Delta and this account for about 95 
percent of its export earnings (Inokoba and Imbua 2010). Crisis which results in reduction of 
oil production within the Niger Delta significantly affects the global oil price. 
Why crisis in the Niger Delta? The Niger Delta suffers from environmental degradation 
and oil pollution caused extensively by oil exploitation and exploration activities, oil spills, 
vandalism of oil pipelines and gas flaring. The results include biodiversity loss, climate change, 
rising sea level, flooding, extreme weather conditions, and land, air, and water pollution which 
severely affect surrounding environment and communities. The effects manifest themselves in 
decreasing fish stocks and contaminated waters supplies and arable land. Poverty in the Niger 
Delta is chronic as over 70 percent of the population live on less than US$1 per day, according 
to 2013 figures published by the Central Bank of Nigeria. 
The Resident Coordinator of the United Nations system in Nigeria, Alberic Kacou calls the 
Niger Delta “a place of frustrated expectations and deep-rooted mistrust” (Ibanga 2008). 
Ikelegbe (2005) described it as a region that is generally restive, with pockets of insurrection 
and armed rebellion. In contrast, the Niger Delta is typically regarded as the world’s 
environmental pollution capital. Inokoba and Imbua (2010) further revealed it is a form of 
warfare or green war carried out by the Nigerian state in collaboration with profit seeking oil 
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multinational firms to destroy the survival base of a group of minority ethnic-nationalities. In 
modern Nigeria, Ibeanu (2006, p. 3) captured the Niger Delta thus:  
 
“. . . available figures show that there is one doctor per 82,000 people, rising to one 
doctor per 132,000 people in some areas, especially the rural areas, which is more than 
three times the national average of 40,000 people per doctor. Only 27 percent of the 
people in the Niger Delta have access to safe drinking water and about 30 percent of 
household have access to electricity, both of which are below the national averages of 
31.7% and 33.6% respectively. . . While 76 percent of Nigerian children attend primary 
school, in the Niger Delta the figure terribly drops to between 30 and 40 percent”. 
 
This reveals the practical conditions of the Niger Delta people and evidence over the past 
years have confirm that these have been the source of agitation and frustration – leading to 
more people engaging in delinquency in the Niger Delta.  
 
2.1 Vandalism 
 
Vandalism, is defined here as a deliberate action of destruction of public or private property 
in keeping with criminal or political intent (Okoli and Orinya 2013). In the Nigeria context, oil 
pipeline vandalism comprises wilful breaking of oil pipelines with the intent to steal petroleum 
products, disruption of petroleum productions and gained political appeasement either from the 
IOCs or the government. In particular, vandalism in the Niger Delta occurs largely due to 
unemployment, inequality, frustration, depression and human rights abuses, development 
deficit, decay of infrastructure and marginalisation. It is expedient to question whether all these 
factors justify moral disengagement actions in the Niger Delta. 
 
2.2 Militancy 
 
Militancy could be defined as a violent and active behaviour principally for the defence and 
support of a cause (predominantly political) which usually lead to the point of fanaticism. 
Therefore, a militant could be described as a person involved in hostile (or a protest movement) 
in the defence of a cause. In this context, Inokoba and Imbua (2010) noted three types of 
militants: intellectual militant, militant mobiliser and violent militant. In this research, the focus 
is on violent militants in the Niger Delta who often attack oil pipelines, installations, and 
platforms with explosives, and the seizure of oil barges, oil wells, flow stations, support vessels, 
and kidnapping of oil workers for ransom, and other oil facilities including state assets to 
prevent the exploitation and/or distribution of crude oil or its refined products. In summary, 
Cesarz et al. (2003) states: 
 
They have brought to the confrontation new assets: rocket-propelled grenades, AK-47s, 
machine guns, satellite phones, and speedboats. They demonstrated a willingness, and 
ability, to kill oil companies and Nigerian military personnel and credibly threaten oil 
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sector infrastructure. Quickly, they proved their dominance of Niger Delta waterways 
and ability to impede the passage of security agents. 
 
To address this challenge, we offer a critical overview of research and theory on the 
relationship between vandalism and militancy, and influence of risk perception and moral 
disengagement in the analyses and discussions. We clarify the key concepts and theories 
concerning the underlying cognitive processes of vandalism and militancy so as to make these 
more accessible to academics and practitioners in the field of mass emergencies and disasters. 
Sometimes, the situations in the Niger Delta are comparable to individuals in a country buying 
more guns but expect less gun related crimes. These apparently problematic situations are 
explored within the risk perception and moral disengagement theories to delineate and uncover 
the potential outcomes and implications. 
 
3. A Review of Salient Constructs1 
 
Essentially while a large number of studies have focused on the relationship between 
vandalism and militancy in Nigeria, these studies have shown varying and contradictory 
results. Scholars and analysts within the region have developed several explanations for the 
cause of the crisis (Dule and Nwankwo 2001; Mafimisebi and Ogbonna 2016; Mafimisebi and 
Nkwunonwo 2014; Ogbeni 2012; Ogbonna and Mafimisebi 2016; Okoli 2013; Okonta and 
Douglas 2001; Omeje 2004; Onuoha 2007; Peterside 2001; Ukeje 2001a; 2001b; Watts 2004) 
but these models appear fundamentally devoid of discussions regarding the influence of risk 
perception and moral disengagement in the crisis. Therefore, by modelling moral 
disengagement as a proximate cause of crisis intensification in the Niger Delta, we might 
expect that its underlying mechanisms would correlate to existing moral evaluation findings. 
We further propose that risk perception predicts both vandalism and militancy, and that abuse 
of moral disengagement mechanisms predicts militancy. Notions of risk perception and moral 
disengagement may have an influence on vandalism and militancy in the Niger Delta. Indeed, 
finding the appropriate tools and mechanisms to first understand the practical root cause of the 
crisis and collectively advocating for promotion of moral disengagement implications remains 
critical to sustainable crisis management in the Niger Delta. Otherwise, the crisis might 
continue to intensify and flow with the adoption of a classic cyclical approach that exists in 
crisis management methodologies. This research extends beyond ‘gaps filling in literature’ to 
the advancement of some salient concepts such as moral disengagement, moral evaluation and 
social trust with their consequent implications for crisis and disaster management in the context 
vandalism and militancy in the Niger Delta. In another perspective, the contributions from the 
research suggest the need to develop new theories based on the findings and in the context of 
moral disengagement and risk perception. 
 
3.1 Moral Disengagement: A Conceptual Interpretation 
Moral disengagement (MD) theory seeks to explain or analyse the means through which 
individuals rationalize their unethical or unjust actions. Although the concept of moral 
disengagement (as developed by Albert Bandura) is highly contentious because there is no 
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universality or common interpretation of what is unethical, immoral or unjust and little is 
known about the antecedents of moral disengagement. For instance, when participants were 
asked to indicate their agreement with questionnaire items on mechanisms of moral 
disengagement such as “people who treat militants as animals or sub-humans should be treated 
as such”, the research findings indicate high degree of acceptance to commit more moral 
defiance. This explanation is more likely because when we are not aware of the moral 
consequences of our actions, unethical behaviour is both psychologically easier (Butterfield, 
Trevino, and Waever 2000; Reynolds 2006; 2008) and epistemologically palatable. However, 
to avoid misconception regarding the role of moral disengagement in vandalism and militancy, 
a conceptual clarification is necessary.  
Moral disengagement is a psychological process by which individuals engage in 
sanctionable behaviour through eight different cognitive mechanisms without distress or self-
condemnation (Bandura 1999). The eight different cognitive mechanisms of moral 
disengagement include moral justification, advantageous comparison, attribution of blame, 
euphemistic labelling, diffusion of responsibility, displacement of responsibility, distorting the 
consequence, and dehumanization. Employing these mechanisms reduces the cognitive 
dissonance individuals experience when engaging in morally questionable behaviour and 
enables their participation in them without the typically attendant negative cognitive or 
emotional consequences (Moore and Gino 2013). For example, when ex-militants in this 
research construe environmental pollutions through their own deliberate vandalism of oil 
pipelines and infrastructures as demonstration and expression of frustration and agitation, three 
mechanisms of MD – moral justification, diffusion of responsibly and euphemistic labelling 
concurrently operate to allow militants penetrate such acts and making the environmental 
pollution undistinguishable.  
In conclusion, mechanisms of moral disengagement allow people to misbehave without 
feeling obliged to any kind of reparation and without carrying any need to change the moral 
standards they are ignoring (Caprara et al. 2009). Thus, unsurprisingly ex-militants in this 
research consistently maintained that ‘attacking international oil companies in Nigeria is an 
expression of frustration and agitation in the Niger Delta’ but this situation can be avoided. 
However, ex-militants are not particularly alone in moral disengagement because evidence and 
allegation of extra-judicial killings, state oppressions, brutality, rape and destructions of local 
communities by Nigerian security forces (often sponsored by international oil companies) in 
Nigeria abound. This demonstrates the complicated nature of moral disengagement and 
perhaps its implication when responding to cases of vandalism and militancy in Nigeria. 
 
3.2 Moral Evaluation: Behavioural Framing 
 
Moral evaluation is the objective appraisal of what is morally appropriate behaviours and 
responses, and why some actions are deemed permissible or impermissible. Past research 
suggests that the evaluation of moral issue often creates moral dilemma because individuals 
are torn between feeling that killing an innocent individual for any reason is inherently wrong 
(a deontological intuition) and that killing one individual to save five makes good economic 
(and therefore moral) sense (a consequentialist intuition) (Liu and Ditto 2012). Moral 
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evaluation can be ambiguous especially when it’s discussed in the context of moral 
disengagement. Theory and research on moral reasoning and disengagement identify the 
evaluation of morality involving delinquency as critical to our understanding of how to mitigate 
and prevent future occurrence of similar cases. 
Evolutionary theories of morality address why people are motivated to perform certain 
actions – such as wilful vandalism of oil pipelines – and to avoid certain actions – such as 
unwillingness to kill without a cause. These theories as discussed in previous studies (e.g. Haidt 
2007) do not explain why people think that others should be punished for moral violations 
(DeScioli and Kurzban 2009). The complicated nature of moral reasoning and evaluation 
becomes most evident when we discuss them in relations to delinquency involving right and 
wrong (lawful and unlawful, obedience and disobedience, harms and benefits, consequences 
and inconsequential). Key evidence comes from militants’ behaviours involving vandalism and 
kidnapping of expatriates in Nigeria. For examples, the surveyed ex-militants in this research 
consistently indicate that they regards and cherish moral values but they become independent 
of such values when environmental risks threaten their sources of livelihood and right to live 
in a sustainable community. This is classical case of moral justification in perpetuating heinous 
activities.  
Moral evaluation can assume quite distinct dimension when there is a change in moral value 
of actions and activities that were previously perceived as amoral or unethical becomes not just 
morally palatable but moral condemnation is seen as accusation to hinder remarkable moral 
heroes (like ex-militants in this research). Within the wider literature, moral evaluation is 
similar to analysing a controversial moral issue of throwing a bomb on a person versus 
throwing a person on a bomb. This is basically problematical and perhaps proposes that no one 
can ever hold universal moral surveillance license despite the widespread concerns and desires 
to see transgressors penalized whether in fact or fiction. Although theories of moral evaluation 
and reasoning do not perceive morality as conscience-centred but rather refer to it as 
mechanisms for self-regulation (e.g. Fessler and Navarrete 2004; Greene 2008; Haidt and 
Joseph 2004), however it appears that morality is rather conscience-centred independent of 
third-party condemnation.  
The possibility that conscience and condemnation are two different component 
mechanisms (DeScioli and Kurban 2009) draws attention to question such as “why militants’ 
engagement in vandalism and kidnapping was perceived as wrong but Nigerian security forces 
extra-judicial killing of innocent indigenes classified as casualty or collateral damage”. In fact, 
this suggests that moral evaluation is not cognitively simple because moral evaluation involves 
perpetrator, victim, and condemner – analysing the same scenario (e.g. vandalism and 
militancy) but each with distinct interpretations. In our case study, three players which involved 
militants, multinational oil companies, and Nigeria government are present, and it is extremely 
difficult and problematic to clearly state which one is the victim, for example. Finally, people 
are more likely to disengage from moral conducts and even become skilled at neutralizing 
morally questionable activities when the mechanisms of moral evaluation and disengagement 
routinely operate in them. 
 
3.3 Defining Social Trust: Implications in Risk Perception and Moral Disengagement 
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The concept of trust is a complex and dynamic phenomenon with ambiguous and 
controversial interpretations. Trust can be the result of institutional arrangement, deep 
dependence and identify formation; and even can be perceive as a multidimensional construct 
containing both cognitive and affective contents including micro (interpersonal) and macro 
(inter-organisational) elements. Furthermore, trust can be a disposition, evaluation, prediction, 
and even expectation. It can likewise be a decision (decision to trust) and an action (act of 
trusting) relying or depending on another person’s (party’s) but linked with uncertainty and 
risk. In complex situations, trust is obstructed by two dominant factors – the decision to trust 
and the degree of trust. For example, should local people in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria 
that have agitate over environmental hazards and disasters trust both government 
representatives and oil companies for sustainably reducing or preventing such disasters? And, 
to what extent can government officials and oil companies judgement of the management of 
such hazards and disasters can be rely upon? The evaluation and prediction of the trust will 
significantly be influenced by risk perception because trust involves a degree of risk (placing 
one’s interests and well-being in the hands of others).  
The concept of social trust is a central and critical issue for practice and policy in mass 
emergencies and disasters management. This is because trust enhances cooperation, improved 
engagement, bridges empowerment, and reduced inappropriate motive in complex situations 
such as environmental disasters and terrorism. Social trust has been model as an independent 
variable (Gulati 1995; McAllister 1995; Smith, Carroll, and Ashford 1995), dependent variable 
(Doney, Cannon, and Mullen 1998; Inkpen and Curral 1997), or moderating variable (Das and 
Teng 1998; Mishra and Spreitzer 1998; Robinson and Rousseau 1994). Social trust is an 
expectation about the kind of motivations the agent is endowed with, which will be the 
prevailing motivations in case of vandalism, militancy (terrorism) and crisis. In clearer term, 
social trust is a measure of the trust that an individual has in government agencies and 
organisations to manage a risk (Siegrist, Cvetkovich, and Roth 2000) and is a primary influence 
on environmental risk perception (Carlton and Jacobson 2013). The focus of this research is 
social trust which means interpersonal or horizontal trust between citizens and political elites, 
or citizen confidence in political institutions and multinational organisations.  
However, what is trust? Trust is the belief that others will not (at worst) knowingly or 
willingly do you harm, and will (at best) act in your interests. Trust is defined as the assured 
reliance on the character, ability, strength, or truth of someone or something (Webster 1991; 
cited in Wray et al. 2006). In most cases, trust is defined in the context of different types of 
relationship with different consequent implications. More relevant to environmental risks and 
disasters, trust involves the belief that others will perform in a way that is beneficial to us or at 
least not detrimental (Gambetta 1988, p. 217). For example, the question of how vandalism 
and militancy is influenced by social trust in others is significant for managing hazards, 
environmental risks, and disasters. 
Two broad schools of thought about trust have emerged in wider literature. First, trust is 
considered as an individual property related to individual characteristics either core personality 
traits or individual social and demographic features (such as age, gender, income, class, and 
education). Second, social trust is considered as a property not of individuals but of social 
systems depicting a top-down approach that focuses on the emergent or systemic properties of 
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societies and their central institutions (Delhey and Newton 2003). Within the social context, 
trust refers to a situation characterised by uncertain situation where one party (trustor) is 
prepared to depend on the actions of another party (trustee). The degree to which people trust 
is influence by belief in the honesty, openness, fairness and goodwill of another party. In the 
context of the Niger Delta crisis, the local people have often rely on scientific experts in the 
past to provide information concerning severity of environmental hazards and disasters, and 
depend on multinational oil companies to take meaningful decisions in preventing, mitigating 
and addressing the “invincible” environmental harms from oil and gas activities. A breach of 
trust between those who take (and manage) risks and those who are (apparently) victimised by 
the risks others take is at crossroad. Key evidence comes from the research conducted by 
Douglas (2004), Duggan (2009), Dule and Nwankwo (2001), Inokoba and Imbua (2010), 
Mafimisebi (2013), Mafimisebi and Thorne (2015), Ogbonna and Mafimisebi (2016), Okoli 
(2013), and Ubhenin (2013). 
Therefore, the needs to provide explicit explanation on how to reconcile the contending 
parties can never be overstated. Research has suggests that trust is most important where people 
consider that they have little personal control over the hazards they are exposed to (Glenn et 
al. 2011). The nature of environmental hazards and disasters in the Niger Delta require high 
degree of trust between experts and local people. Local people trust in knowledge of the 
expertise (e.g. multinational oil companies) can be significantly impacted once environmental 
practices of multinational oil companies compromise their safety and well-being, and right to 
live in a sustainable community. Hence, the theory that organisation’s (multinational oil 
companies) is open and reliable in communicating possible environmental impacts of their 
activities in the Niger Delta and range of activities gear towards addressing such impacts can 
induce local indigenes (people) to trust such organisations. Although organisational reputation 
can affect social trust, the perceived honesty of organisation in environmental reporting and 
communication with vulnerable communities can help build and develop trust.   
 
3.4 Research Objectives and Questions 
 
The current research aimed at testing hypotheses connected with broader ongoing PhD 
research investigating impact of moral disengagement in risk and crisis management. However, 
as to understand the risk perception of the actors involved in the Niger Delta crisis, we chose 
to analyse the link between risk perception and moral disengagement in the context of crisis 
management. This is achieved with particular reference to ex-militants in the Niger Delta who 
were members of the Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND) and Niger Delta 
People’s Volunteers Force (NDPVF), Port Harcourt, Nigeria. The main objective of this study 
is to critically analyse the influence of risk perception and moral disengagement in the context 
of vandalism and militancy among ex-militants in the Niger Delta, Nigeria. The research seeks 
to: (1) further our understanding of how risk perception and moral disengagement impact crisis 
management, and (2) make recommendations that might improve the management of novel 
crisis. To achieve these objectives, the following research questions were pragmatically 
addressed: 
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RQ1: How do militants perceive vandalism and violence perpetuated against 
international oil companies? 
RQ2: What factors influence risk perception and moral disengagement? 
 
4. Hypothesis Development 
 
In this section, we discuss the salient issues of the research to derived two main hypotheses. 
These salient issues – risk perception and moral disengagement as previously noted are central 
to the research context presented here and critical for sustainable crisis and disaster 
management practice especially in Nigeria. 
 
4.1 Risk Perception Predict both Vandalism and Militancy 
 
A number of prior studies on risk perception mostly fixated on both rational-choice and 
experiential models of risk (Bostrom et al. 1994; Epestein 1994; Leiserowitz 2006; Lowenstein 
et al. 2001; Read et al. 1994; Sjoberg, 2000; Slimak and Dietz 2006; Slovic 1987; Slovic et al. 
2002). However, the extent to which militants (vandals) perceive risk is crucial towards 
sustainable crisis management. Their perception of risk apparently results in some form of 
action or response (Rahm and Reddick 2011). In context, there is indisputable thesis lacking 
of empirical validation that both underestimation and overestimation of risk (crisis) can result 
in unpleasant or unwanted outcomes.  Risk perception, defined as the subjective judgements 
that people make about the threat posed by a hazard (Leiserowitz 2006; Slovic 1987; 1999); 
may partially explain why people engage in vandalism and militancy. A key component of risk 
and crisis communication in the Niger Delta crisis is to pragmatically understand risk 
perceptions of the actors involved. Moreover, policymakers have a crucial role to play in 
understanding the risk-specific dynamics (such as risk voluntariness, risk salience, social trust, 
environmental attitudes, perception of risk control, public’s familiarity with the risk, and the 
morality of the risk) that influence risk perception (Carlton and Jacobson 2013; Dunlap et al. 
2000; Hawcroft and Milfont 2010; Sandman 1987; Siegrist et al. 2000) as components of 
sustainable crisis management in the Niger Delta. 
The link between delinquent behaviour (vandals and militants) and risk perception is well 
established. To avoid misconceptions regarding the role of risk perception in the context of 
vandalism and militancy, which are causally linked, we draw on the construct that people only 
know things to be high risk when they are self-aware and concerned about it (or perceive it to 
be so). Empirical studies have confirmed that higher levels of environmental concern are 
associated with greater risk perceptions across a variety of environmental risks (Carlton and 
Jacobson, 2013; Kellstedt et al. 2008; Slimak and Dietz 2006; Stern and Dietz 1994). This 
correlates to the existing knowledge regarding risk perception, specifically knowledge theory, 
which hypothesises that individuals perceive things to be dangerous, or a threat, because they 
know them to be dangerous (Gerber and Neeley 2005). Albeit the understanding of the 
knowledge theory of risk perception is not sufficient to evaluate people’s perception of risk, 
Wildavsky and Dake (1990) examine five theories of risk perception which include knowledge 
theory. 
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Quite quintessentially, errors in risk perception can severely hamper strategic options for 
managing risk/crisis. Differences in perception of risk from the Niger Delta crisis do seem to 
align with differences in general management and political issues (Rahm and Reddick 2011). 
Thus, it may not be wrong to posit that this is a fundamental source to the crisis. Nonetheless, 
perceptions are not facts but can be a foundation for other attitudes and behaviours. For 
example, studies have noted that militants within the Niger Delta perceive their activities 
(vandalism, violence, kidnapping, etc.) as self-determination and liberation struggles against 
the IOCs for environmental degradation and pollution and against the Nigerian state for 
resource control and oil revenue, poverty and decay infrastructural development, bad corporate 
governance and corruption (Cesarz et al. 2003; Inokoba and Imbua 2010; Mafimisebi 2016; 
Mafimisebi and Thorne 2015; Ubhenin and Aiya 2010; Ubhenin 2013). Therefore, perception 
issues can never be neglected and are integral to our understanding of the context presented in 
this research. 
Following this, quite often in crisis management perception (though not reality) thus 
become reality. However complex and controversial that may seem, the issue of risk perception 
has been found to be contingent as much on context and culture as physical reality (Carlton 
and Jacobson 2013; Slovic 1987; Slovic et al. 1980). Since risk perceptions could be measured 
and the results replicated (Borodzizc 2005, p. 22), this would provide the foundation to 
objectively address the Niger Delta crisis. A word of caution is that risky decision making 
based on empirical evidence of risk perception can prove problematic when viewed in the 
context of practical crisis management. Notwithstanding this critique, psychometric 
approaches in risk perception can help balance public perceptions if at variance with, or 
disagreeing with, expert assessments (Lichtenstein et al. 1978; Otway and Von Winterfeldt 
1982; Pidgeon et al. 1992; Slovic et al. 1980; Starr 1969) of the crisis. Therefore, in the word 
of Borodzizc (2005, p. 20), any risk measurement needs to be sensitive to the system of 
understanding in which that risk is viewed. In a more specific perspective, the risk perception 
of militants (including delinquent youths) in the Niger Delta affect their judgement of 
vandalism and militancy in Nigeria. However, we argue below that abuse of moral 
disengagement mechanisms may be a direct causation in crisis intensification. 
 
4.2 Abuse of Moral Disengagement Mechanisms (MDM) Predict Militancy 
 
Moral disengagement has been discoursed in the context of aggressive and violent conduct 
– war, genocide, and terrorism (Bandura 1999; Bandura et al. 1996; Paciello et al. 2008; Pelton 
et al. 2004; South and Wood 2006), corporate transgression and organisational corruption 
(Bandura, Caprara, and Zsolnai 2000; Beu and Buckley 2004; Detert et al. 2008; Moore 2008; 
White, Bandura, and Bero 2009), peace and conflict (Jackson and Sparr 2005; McAlister 2001), 
computer hacking (Rogers 2003; Young, Zhang, and Prybutok 2007), less humane conduct 
(Fiske 2004), more deviant behaviour (Ntayi et al. 2010), and has been shown to lead to greater 
aggression (Bandura et al. 1996). Moral disengagement also plays a precarious role in the 
processes of organisational crisis (Mafimisebi 2013). In fact, Mafimisebi (2013) demonstrate 
that the susceptibility to moral disengagement mechanisms leads to crisis intensification and 
can cause unintended consequences for organisations. However, the present research 
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investigates moral disengagement in the context of militancy and vandalism. To put the Niger 
Delta crisis in perspective, Bandura (1990, p. 43) remarked that the mechanisms of moral 
disengagement operate in everyday situations in which decent people routinely perform 
activities having injurious human effects, to further their own interests or for profit. 
In the context of the Niger Delta crisis, morality analysis of crisis management (CM) 
broadly demands that both the challengers’ – (militants) and antagonists’ (international oil 
companies and Nigeria state) ceased acts or actions typically abuse MDM. If MDM and CM 
are connected then the explanation of morality in crisis will unavoidably tie to the elucidation 
of these phenomena. Critically, morality analyses in crisis management practice cannot escape 
the multiple complexities which can be characteristically described in terms of game theory. 
Game theoretic analyses are most useful to model and manage risks from adversarial settings. 
These enable analysts think more clearly and effectively about the risks of adversarial situations 
by clarifying what should be modelled as decision variables for different players and what 
should be modelled as chance or consequence variables (Cox 2009). Albeit not without 
limitations, the study of game theory suggests that actors (players) in crisis can significantly 
affect each other’s outcomes.  
Similarly, game theory can do much to alleviate dangerously oversimplified approaches to 
crisis management, such as those that ignore issues of crisis morality and moral disengagement 
(for example, attribution theory). At its most basic level, game theoretic analysis in crisis 
demands every stakeholder challenges their own assumptions with broader perspective of 
others and practically considers the interaction of goals which are likely to shape behaviour. 
Empirical studies have proved the practical usefulness of game theory in understanding the 
evolution of mechanisms for strategic behaviour in humans and non-human species (Kohlberg 
1981; Krebs and Davies 1993; Macnamara 1991; Maynard Smith 1982). Further, given the 
dynamic nature of crisis and problematic definition of morality in crisis response, what can be 
inferred about the implications of moral disengagement abuse in crisis situations? The Niger 
Delta crisis principally involves three set of players (Nigerian state, International oil companies 
and Host communities) with asymmetric positions, each requiring different adaptations for 
sustainable crisis management. Therefore it is possible that moral disengagement mechanisms 
can predict militancy in Nigeria. 
The debate of whether particular actions (such as militancy, vandalism and military 
oppression) are right or wrong continues to generate contemporary interests among 
practitioners and laypeople. Moral disengagement explains how people come to engage in 
detrimental conducts that are otherwise incongruent with their moral standards (Bandura 1999). 
We contribute morality analysis of crisis response, focusing on moral disengagement. The 
evolutionary justifications for why specific actions or responses are apportioned particular 
moral values have received substantial devotion within the body of knowledge (for example, 
Alexander 1987; Darwin 1871; DeScioli and Kurzban 2008; de Waal 1996; Haidt and Joseph 
2004; 2008; Hauser 2006; Krebs and Janicki 2004; Lieberman, Tooby, and Cosmides 2003; 
2007; Moore 1903; Ridley 1996; Wilson 1993; Wright 1994). However, why militancy is 
perceived as ‘wrong’ and military oppression to combat militants ‘right’ are not always clearly 
justify and how they are different from moral disengagement abuse in crisis is not always clear. 
Bandura (1999; 2002) described eight instruments of moral disengagement (moral 
justification, euphemistic labelling, advantageous comparison, displacement of responsibility, 
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diffusion of responsibility, distortion of the consequences, attribute of blame and 
dehumanisation of victim) which allow people to misbehave without feeling obliged to provide 
any kind of reparation and self-flagellation that such behaviour usually evokes. More explicitly, 
these eight cognitive mechanisms serve to disinhibit an individual’s ethical behaviour and 
makes individuals more or less inclined to morally disengage (Baker, Detert, and Trevino 2006; 
Bandura 1986; Bandura et al. 1996; Pelton, Gound, Forehand, and Brody 2004). Exploiting 
any of these mechanisms, an individual action becomes morally palatable and provide avenues 
to engage in unethical and inhumane behaviour without the self-censure such an act would 
typically provoke (Bandura 1999; Bandura et al. 2001; Detert, Trevino, and Sweitzer 2008; 
Mafimisebi and Thorne 2015; Moore et al. 2012). On this premise, it can be argue that abuse 
of moral disengagement mechanisms predict militancy and crisis intensification in the Niger 
Delta. Empirical studies have suggested that the mind after moral disengagement welcomes 
transgressions, violence, cruelty and nothing good is likely to happen (Bandura 1986; 1990; 
Bandura, Barbaranelli, Caprara, and Pastorelli 1996; Chugh et al. 2014; Fiske 2004; Moore 
2007; Moore et al. 2012; Ntayi, Eyaa, and Ngoma 2010). It can therefore be concluded that 
when there are avenues to exploit moral disengagement mechanisms such avenues create 
rooms for inhumane conducts and activities such as vandalism and militancy. 
 
4.3 Two Main Hypotheses 
 
The discussion above offers a theoretical underpinning to build and develop two main 
hypotheses concerning the vandalism-militancy relationship under different conditions. This 
research presents empirical evidence gathered from the study of ex-militants in the Niger Delta 
to challenge established mythologies in crisis and disaster management about risk perception 
and moral disengagement which impinge upon sustainable crisis management. In this research, 
the following hypotheses were formulated: (1) risk perception predicts both vandalism (oil 
facilities and state assets) and militancy; (2) abuse of moral disengagement mechanisms 
(mechanisms) predicts militancy. The idea that vandals and militants are inhumane and that if 
we can manage to alienate or capture them will prevent or reduce future crisis/disaster may 
seem controversial from the point of view of moral disengagement. There are two reasons why 
this conventional wisdom appears to be invalid. First, when vandals and militants commit 
heinous act such as deliberate blowing up of oil pipelines and kidnapping – such acts do not 
make them less of human. The contention is that by dehumanizing them and then engages in 
their wilful destruction through the instrumentality of the law and perhaps moral 
disengagement mechanisms (e.g. advantageous comparison and moral justification) crisis 
responders similarly become morally disengaged (deontological perspective). Second, the 
magnitudes of the harmful consequences are what best describe vandalism and militancy; and 
the notion that the more militants who die, the less we care fundamentally present the same 
resemblance (consequentialism perspective). 
 
5. Research Method 
 
Mafimisebi and Thorne: Vandalism-Militancy Relationship 
15 
The survey population comprised 865 ex-militants in the Niger Delta generally members 
of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) and Niger Delta People’s 
Volunteers Force (NDPVF). The participants are from approximately 30 communities and 
reside in the Niger Delta. In studying mechanisms of moral disengagement across different 
contexts, several methods and measures were used to meet the specific features of misconducts 
under analysis (Caprara et al. 2009). Specific to this study, both the 15-question New 
Ecological Paradigm (NEP) scale (Dunlap et al. 2000) and the Civic Moral Disengagement 
Scale (CMDS) (Caprara and Capnna 2005; Caprara et al. 2006; Caprara et al. 2009) were used 
to measure risk perception and moral disengagement in the Niger Delta crisis. In accordance 
with previous findings we expected risk perception and moral disengagement to be closely 
associated with vandalism and militancy (Bandura et al. 1996). In contrast, we expect CMDS 
to be the only significant predictor of crisis intensification and delinquent behaviours like 
vandalism and militancy. There are variables such as new ecological paradigm, effect of 
military oppression, social trust, group affiliation, proximity to oil company base and gender 
that were included in the regression models to empirically determine how they influence 
people’s perception of risk. 
 
5.1 Participants and Procedures 
 
Participants were 753 Niger Delta ex-militants (89% males), ranging in age from 19 to 42 
years (M = 21.50, SD = 8.3).  Nine percent of the participants had primary education, 51% 
completed secondary education, 25% completed tertiary education, and 15% had a university 
degree. The participants were recruited by two trained conflict resolution experts in Port 
Harcourt, Nigeria. A survey instrument was adapted and developed from previous research 
(Caprara et al. 2006; Caprara et al. 2009; Carlton and Jacobson 2013; Sagone and De Caroli 
2013). The survey along with a cover letter detailing the research aim was sent to the two 
conflict resolution experts for assessment. The initial survey was mailed out in the first week 
of November 2013. After three rounds of surveys, 753 participants completed the surveys by 
January, 2014 representing a response rate of 87.05%. The ex-militants were thoroughly 
briefed on the general aims of the study and instructed on how to complete the survey. The 
study complied with stringent ethical research procedure with participants consent sought, 
while letting subjects voluntarily withdraw from participating if they felt uncomfortable. Most 
importantly, the participants’ personal data were protected and consents were sought to allow 
voluntary participation. 
 
5.2 Measures 
 
5.2.1 Risk Perception 
Participants were asked to rate their level of concern about 14 environmental risks (Table 
1). Three initial risks (storm surge, coastal erosion and groundwater contamination) included 
in the survey were dropped from the analysis due to inappropriate loading. The risks were 
selected based on previous findings (Carlton and Jacobson 2013; Mafimisebi 2013; Mafimisebi 
and Nkwunonwo 2014; Mafimisebi and Thorne 2015) and findings from in-depth interviews 
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with stakeholders in the Niger Delta. These risks were peculiar to the Niger Delta crisis and 
mostly mentioned during the interviews. The most-least rating method (McCarthy and Shrum 
2000) was adopted because it has been found to efficiently avoid end-piling when rating lists 
of items. The list of risks was presented to participants to rate which one is least and most 
concern to them. Following this, participants use a 10-point rating scale to rate each of the 
risks. The endpoints of the scale were labelled, with 10 meaning “strongly concerned” and 1 
meaning “not concerned at all”. The risk questions were used to perform a factor analysis 
(extraction method; principal component analysis) with varimax rotation to reduce the 
variables into interpretable factors (Carlton and Jacobson 2013). Regression method helps to 
obtained factor scores which are retain for analysis. 
 
5.2.2 Moral Disengagement 
The CMDS composed of 32 items four for each mechanism, which participants must 
respond on a 5-point Likert scale (from 1 = strongly disagree, to 5 = strongly agree) response 
format. The moral disengagement scale was originally developed as a 40 item scale by Bandura 
et al. (1996) and Caprara et al. (2006) however, previous studies on the full 40 item version 
showed the scale being unidimensional with a Cronbach alpha of .94 (Caprara et al. 2009).  Ex-
militants rated their degree of acceptance of moral exemptions presented in 32 items covering 
the eight different mechanisms by which moral self-sanctions can be disengaged from militant 
conduct (α = . 89). A prototypical item is “It is alright to destroy oil pipelines and state assets 
because of environmental degradation”. The scale measured the preference to use the following 
mechanisms of moral disengagement: 
 
1. Dehumanisation (e.g., “people who treat militants as animals should be treated as 
such”); 
2. Advantageous comparison (e.g., “militants cannot be blamed if they vandalise and 
kidnap because most key government officials and security agents are also involved in 
such act”); 
3. Diffusion of responsibility (e.g., “militants are never responsible for the 
environmental risks in the Niger Delta”); 
4. Attribution of blame (e.g., “If international oil companies failed to clean up the 
environment it’s their fault if they are attack due to that”); 
5. Distortion of consequences (e.g., “Vandalism and militancy cannot be considered 
reprehensible considering that government officials are insensitive to the people’s 
demand”); 
6. Moral justification (e.g., “It is alright to attack international oil companies and 
Nigerian security agents because they collaborate to pollute the Niger Delta”); 
7. Euphemistic labelling (e.g., “Attacking international oil companies is the expression 
of frustration and agitation in the Niger Delta); 
8. Displacement of responsibility (e.g., “People cannot be held accountable for violence 
committed because they are push to the wall”). 
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Cronbach’s alpha of the 32-items for this range between .73 and .89, with corrected item-
scale correlations ranging from .23 to .58. 
 
5.2.3 Participants protection 
Based on the sensitivity of the Niger Delta crisis and guidelines for conducting ethically 
sound research which involves purpose, rigour, imagination, care for others, and economy have 
been complied with; the participants personal data were deliberately protected through the 
research design and removed from the findings. Furthermore, prior to data collection for the 
research, the participants have been assured of confidentiality through the two conflict 
resolution specialists who help facilitate and gather data for the study. Likewise, all participants 
were assured that the data is for research purposes only. In this case, participants were given 
options to opt out from the study if they felt uncomfortable. In another perspective, the research 
was design to understand the influence of risk perception and moral disengagement in 
vandalism and militancy. The essence is not to promote vandals and militants’ agenda rather 
to understand what motivate them and how that understanding could provide useful and 
effective strategies to deal with environmental disasters, vandalism and militancy in the context 
of this research. The surveyed participants have been granted presidential amnesty by the 
Nigerian government in 2009 and therefore this research cannot be perceived as promoting 
their agenda. In fact, the policy implications of the research are clear because reduction in 
vandalism and militancy will lead to increase in production of crude oil and consequently 
increase in revenue for the Nigerian government. The global economy will further benefits 
because increase in crude oil production in Nigeria will lead to stability in global energy market 
and help address economic problems of energy disequilibrium. 
 
5.2.4 Data analysis plan 
The data analysis was conducted using SPSS 15. The statistical test carried out includes 
descriptive statistics, independent samples t-test, ANOVA, and regression analysis. Each of the 
risk factor components were used as a dependent variable and the NEP scale, the extent to 
which participants were affected by military oppression, social trust, participants group 
affiliation, proximity to oil company base, and gender of participants used as independent 
variables in a multiple regression analysis. 
 
6. Results and Analysis 
 
6.1 Rate of Response and Demographics 
 
A total of 753 participants completed the surveys representing a response rate of 87.05%. 
The gender ratio using a non-response check indicates a similar pattern. The majority of the 
participants (89%) were male because most of the participants were recruited from male 
dominated communities in the Niger Delta and appear to be most willing to provide 
information on delinquency involving vandalism and militancy compared to their female 
counterparts. The mean participant identified as independent based on group affiliation, rating 
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themselves 4.16 (SD = 1.83) on the 5-point group scale. Most of the participants (98%) have 
lived in Port Harcourt for at least the last 10 years. 
 
 
 
6.2 Research Question (RQ) 1: How do militants perceive vandalism and violence 
perpetuated against international oil companies? 
 
Table 1 showed the scores for each risk item. The overall mean score for the risk items was 
6.13 on a scale of 1 – 10. Participants were most concerned about farmland/fishing water 
destruction (M = 7.91, SD = 2.26); extreme weather conditions (M = 7.78, SD = 2.19); drinking 
water loss (M = 7.67, SD = 2.18); and property damage from oil spills (M = 7.43, SD = 2.29). 
In contrast, participants were least concerned about decline in animals (M = 4.97, SD = 2.18); 
property damage/revenue loss due to gas flare (M = 4.83, SD = 2.11); decline in plants (M = 
4.68, SD = 2.23); and flora, fauna and biodiversity loss (M = 4.64, SD = 2.17). In clearer term, 
three main factors of the risk data explaining 73.4% of the variance were retained based on the 
factors with eigenvalues over 1 and evaluation of visual screen plot (Ferguson and Cox 1993). 
Furthermore, the factors were reviewed and interpreted as physical environmental risks (M = 
7.33, SD = 1.85); economic risks (M = 5.72, SD = 1.73); and biological risks (M = 4.89, 1.78). 
In conclusion, all the three components are statistically significant and had acceptable internal 
consistency (Table 1). Thus, it can be deduced from the risk data that physical environmental 
risks were perceived higher than the other two categories (economic risks and biological risks). 
This was found to be the result of vandalism and militancy in the Niger Delta, Nigeria. An 
interesting aspect of managing vandalism and militancy, however, is that addressing 
environmental risks and disasters might lead to sustainable crisis management in Nigeria. This 
can be achieved through improvement in social trust between local communities, government 
representatives, and multinational oil companies. Trust has been found to enhance cooperation, 
improved engagement, bridges empowerment, and reduces inappropriate motive in complex 
situations such as environmental disasters and terrorism. 
 
6.3 Research Question (RQ) 2: What factors influence risk perception and moral 
disengagement? 
 
The social trust indicators had high internal consistency (alpha = .86) and were averaged 
into a social trust index. The mean social index score was 3.21 (SD = 0.82) out of 5. The 15-
item New Ecological Paradigm scale also had strong internal consistency (alpha = .89). 
Additionally, fourteen of the 15 questions loaded highly (≥ .52) on the first unrotated factor, 
which is sufficient for treating the NEP as a unidimensional scale (Dunlap et al. 2000). The 
mean score of the NEP was 4.13 (SD = 0.67) on a 5-point scale, suggesting “little-to-moderate” 
environmental defiance among participants. The three regression models (biological risks, 
economic risks and physical environment risks) were statistically significant at the p < 0.001 
level. However, the adjusted r2 values ranged from 0.18 – 0.23. The results of the regression 
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are revealed in table 2. It can be interpreted that environmental victimisation and moralistic 
punishment affect high risk behaviours. 
 
Table 1: Niger Delta environmental risk perceptions divided into scales based on a factor 
analysis 
 
 
Risk Item 
 
Mean (M) 
 
Standard Deviation 
(SD) 
 
Factor Loading 
(FL) 
Biological risks 4.89 1.78 α = .77 
Reduction in fish 5.83 2.07 .58 
Reduction in animals 4.97 2.18 .83 
Decline in plants 4.68 2.23 .87 
Flora, fauna, and biodiversity loss 4.64 2.17 .61 
Physical environment risks 7.33 1.85 α = .91 
Drinking water loss 7.67 2.18 .76 
Drought/flood/climate change 6.89 2.09 .85 
Farmland/Fishing water destruction 7.91 2.26 .89 
Sea-level rise 6.74 2.03 .82 
Extreme weather condition 7.78 2.19 .76 
Economic risks 5.72 1.73 α = .68 
Increase in insurance premium 6.39 2.26 .79 
Loss of profit/revenue 6.81 2.19 .82 
Depreciation of property value 5.84 1.62 .61 
Property damage from oil spills 7.43 2.29 .89 
Property damage/revenue loss due to gas 
flare 
4.83 2.11 .83 
Note: Overall mean was 6.13. Sample size varied by question from 537 – 549. 
 
 
Table 2: Multiple regression models by risk categorisation of risk perception as the 
dependent variable. The dependent variables are the retained risk factor scores from the 
principal component analysis. 
 
 
 
Independent variable 
 
Model 1: Physical 
environment risk (β) 
 
Model 2: 
Economic risk (β) 
 
Model 3: Biological 
risk (β) 
New ecological paradigm1 0.69*** -0.35* 0.44*** 
Effect of military oppression2 0.53*** -0.15* 0.06 
Social trust3 0.47*** 0.06 -0.23 
Group affiliation4 -0.14*** 0.11*** 0.02 
Proximity to oil company base 0.06 -0.11 -0.14 
Gender5 0.31* 0.21* -0.069 
Note: Asterisks indicate statistical significance: * = p < 0.05, *** = p < 0.001.1 Higher scores: 
higher environmental deviance. 2 Higher scores: greater perceived effects of military 
oppression.3 Higher scores: perceived government distrust.4 Higher scores: high group 
influence. 5 Dichotomous categorical variable, Man = 0, Woman = 1 
The NEP score was the strongest predictor of physical environmental risk perception (β = 
0.69, p < 0.001), with participants expressing greater environmental concern also perceiving 
greater risk. The effect of military oppression was another strongest indicator of both physical 
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environment risks (β = 0.53, p < 0.05) and having a strong influence on economic risks (β = -
0.15, p < 0.001). In addition, participants who expressed less concerned for the environment 
also perceived greater mistrust by the government (β = 0.47, p < 0.001). Unlike in previous 
studies (Carlton and Jacobson 2013), group affiliation predict both economic risks perception 
(β = 0.11, p < 0.001) and physical environment risks perception (β = -0.14, p < 0.05). The three 
models found no statistical significance of proximity to oil company location having any 
influence on risk perception of the moral disengagers. 
In another empirical analysis using the stepwise method, the eight mechanisms of moral 
disengagement were used as dependent variable and the predictor variables factors of 
perception were used to understand what drives the use of moral disengagement. As revealed 
(in Table 3) based on 2 (Gender) × 2 (Group Affiliation) × 8 (Mechanisms of Moral 
Disengagement) analysis of variance, gender and group affiliation have effects on the mean 
scores in each mechanisms of civil moral disengagement. The predictor variable factors of 
perception (frustration, marginalisation, resource control, collusion, poverty, and corruption, 
and dynamism, lack of social trust, perseverance, double standards and environmental 
degradation) were factors which existing findings revealed as some of the proximate cause of 
the Niger Delta crisis. The findings showed that frustration and marginalisation has significant 
impact on moral justification; perseverance, double standards and environmental degradation 
affected advantageous comparison; dynamism, corruption impact the displacement of 
responsibility; resource control and poverty affect attribution of blame; while collusion and 
lack of social trust affected dehumanisation of victims (Table 3). 
 
7. General Discussion 
 
The present study provides strong evidence that risk perception and moral disengagement 
affect crisis intensification. Utilising a sample of ex-militants, the study builds upon previous 
literature by further supporting the link between high risk behaviour (militancy, vandalism) 
and risk perception. However, additional evidence is provided on the implication of risk 
perception and moral disengagement on crisis management practice. Further, these results 
demonstrate errors in risk perception evaluation can cause counter-crisis response and result in 
applying the wrong strategic option. The results confirm existing research findings where 
undermining public risk perception can impede effective crisis management (Seeger 2006). 
Not surprisingly, there was significant high correlation between abuse of moral disengagement 
and militancy in the Niger Delta. When examining the overall sample, findings were consistent 
with previous empirical studies, confirming a link between dehumanisation and high risk 
behaviour (Chugh et al. 2014; Danielson et al. 2006). The research findings suggest that 
collusion and lack of social trust affect dehumanisation of victims. Therefore, improvement in 
social trust by addressing the traumatic experience of vulnerable people (ex-militants, and local 
communities’ members) and ensure accumulation of favourable circumstances such as 
engagement in active economics activities and transparency in corporate governance can help 
mitigate the rate of vandalism and militancy in the Niger Delta. 
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Table 3: Mechanisms (Mechanisms) of Moral Disengagement 
 
 
 
Mechanisms of MD 
 
 
Gender 
 
Group 
Affiliation 
 
 
M 
 
 
SD 
 
 
ANOVA 
 
Moral justification 
Man 
 
Woman 
MEND 
NDPVF 
2.63 
1.89 
0.64 
0.38 
 
 
8.73* 
MEND 
NDPVF 
1.95 
1.89 
0.59 
0.53 
 
Displacement of 
responsibility 
 
Man 
 
Woman 
MEND 
NDPVF 
2.03 
2.43 
0.48 
0.63 
 
 
5.13* 
MEND 
NDPVF 
1.96 
1.92 
0.57 
0.60 
 
Euphemistic labelling 
Man 
 
Woman 
MEND 
NDPVF 
2.10 
2.14 
0.52 
0.57 
 
 
11.43* 
MEND 
NDPVF 
2.04 
2.16 
0.58 
0.54 
 
Diffusion of responsibility 
Man 
 
Woman 
MEND 
NDPVF 
1.96 
1.89 
0.60 
0.57 
 
 
4.26** 
MEND 
NDPVF 
2.04 
2.47 
0.49 
0.67 
 
Distorting the consequences 
Man 
 
Woman 
MEND 
NDPVF 
2.97 
2.18 
0.57 
0.62 
 
 
13.73* 
MEND 
NDPVF 
2.17 
2.04 
0.68 
0.52 
 
Attribution of blame 
Man 
 
Woman 
MEND 
NDPVF 
2.04 
2.43 
0.65 
0.12 
 
 
4.15** MEND 
NDPVF 
1.97 
1.87 
0.47 
0.54 
 
Dehumanisation of victim 
Man 
 
Woman 
MEND 
NDPVF 
2.58 
1.74 
0.59 
0.36 
 
 
8.26* 
 MEND 
NDPFV 
1.98 
1.69 
0.72 
0.61 
 
Advantageous comparison 
 
Man 
 
Woman 
MEND 
NDPVF 
2.43 
1.98 
0.69 
0.35 
 
 
7.43* 
MEND 
NDPVF 
2.16 
1.73 
0.57 
0.35 
Note: Mean scores significant statistical differences for * = p < 0.01, ** = p < 0.05. 
 
While the research findings confirm that environmental risks are perceived more important 
than economic and biological risks, environmental concerns are nothing new because 
generations of people have expressed anxiety over local conditions in different forms. 
Nevertheless, what is relatively unconventional about environmental risks, disasters and 
militancy is the more persistent discourse of these issues and how they can impact global and 
local economy, people and sustainable development. The risk may have been grossly 
overstated but quite often perception of risk thus become reality (Mafimisebi 2013). This 
statement is made in reference to the Niger Delta crisis because those who take risks and those 
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who are victimised by risks others take may have been at crossroad. Therefore, the research 
concludes that what is needed is explicit theory that explains how to reconcile the parties in 
crisis. This can be achieved through application of game theory which play essential role in 
understanding how parties in crisis can balance counter-interest especially in adversarial 
settings. Game theoretical analyses are particularly useful in managing risks from adversarial 
setting because analysts can think more clearly and effectively about what should be modelled 
as decision variables and what should be included as consequence variables (Cox 2009). For 
example, the understanding of these predictor variable factors such as poverty, resource 
control, marginalisation, double standards, environmental degradation, and frustration of 
vulnerable people form key components of sustainable crisis management in the Niger Delta 
are imperative for policy design and implementation.  
The results suggest that managing crisis using the victim perspective is fundamental to 
sustainable crisis management. The insights generated from the findings complement existing 
research (Carlton and Jacobson 2013; Dunlap et al. 2000; Leiserowitz 2006; Mafimisebi and 
Thorne 2015). The antecedents and consequences of vandalism and militancy in the Niger 
Delta represent a crucial paradigm to provide lasting solutions. In this research, we demonstrate 
how morality analysis of crisis management could further help to shape behaviours of actors 
in crisis. The focus should be clear evaluation of the moral implications of decision making 
affecting the environment in the Niger Delta. The Nigerian government can benefit from 
investment in local education aim at creating more awareness of vandalism and militancy in 
the Niger Delta. In the same vein, it makes more business sense for multinational oil companies 
like Shell and Chevron to actively engage in facilitating educational programmes that promote 
sustainable environmental behaviours in local communities.  
Like previous research (Bandura 1990; Fiske 2004; Moore et al. 2012; Ntayi, Eyaa, and 
Ngoma 2010), moral disengagement abuse predicts militant behaviours in the Niger Delta. This 
is particularly true because distrust have been expressed by the ex-militants, as well as local 
people who have cited cases of military oppression and organised corporate irresponsibility. 
The ability to remain transparent in environmental reporting and engagement of multinational 
oil companies, and government initiatives such as helping vulnerable people understand how 
to tackle effects of environmental risks and disasters are crucial towards sustainable solutions. 
Perception issue must be clarified because risk perception and moral disengagement underpin 
crisis intensification and influence risk behaviours. The questions and efforts over the years 
have been how crises and disasters management theories and practices could help solve 
problem of environmental disasters, vandalism and militancy but now the core proposition is 
what happens when these theories and practices are the real problem.  
The failure of government agencies (such as Nigerian National Petroleum Company, 
Ministry of Petroleum Resources, Niger Delta Development Commission) and multinational 
oil companies (e.g. Shell Nigeria, Chevron Nigeria, and Exxon-Mobil Producing Unlimited) in 
Nigeria to successfully prevent vandalism and militancy demonstrate the need to challenge 
established views and approaches to the management of such incidents. Past models including 
the declaration of amnesty for militants have gained relative success and both government and 
organisational policies offers limited hope of narrowing the frequent and incessant vandalism 
of oil pipelines and destruction of oil platforms and wells in Nigeria. This suggests that a 
different or alternative form of strategies such as changing the patterns of oil pipelines networks 
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in the Niger Delta, remote surveillance of oil pipelines, meeting essential needs through 
provision of basic infrastructures, reducing unemployment rate through policies, reducing level 
of illiteracy, engagement of local communities in decision making involving the environment, 
and community policing are required to address the vulnerable situation of the Niger Delta.  
There is also need to strengthen legislations to aid effective prosecutions and addressing 
the morality issue through focus groups discussion with affected communities in the Niger 
Delta. The current Nigeria Petroleum Industry Bill which has proposed to address the 
communities’ agitation and resource control issues require urgent implementation. Nigerian 
government and multinational oil companies in Nigeria could invest in engaging local 
communities through risk and crisis management training aimed at addressing risk perception, 
morality defiance, social trust, and how the Niger Delta crisis can affect sustained growth of 
local businesses. The possible implication is that once local people understand how the crises 
affect them, their businesses and the environment, there is potential for change in attitudes 
towards vandalism and militancy in the region. Investment in risk and crisis management 
training for local communities makes sense because significant reduction in vandalism and 
militancy can lead to increase in petroleum productions and consequently lead to more 
revenues for the government and the organisations concerns.  
Our results have two essential implications. First, our findings suggest that individuals 
susceptible to moral disengagement abuses are not particularly predestined to engage in 
delinquent behaviours. Thus, we identify the need for policy redirection on issues of morality 
and risk perception in the Niger Delta. Second, continuous exploitation of moral 
disengagement instruments (mechanisms) would continue to intensify crisis. This further 
suggests the need to evaluate the current approach to risk and crisis management. Though the 
limitation of the study is acknowledged because the sample used might be insufficient to 
generalise, there are opportunities for additional research. Future research might need to focus 
on the mediating role of moral disengagement on crisis management. Since the present study 
combines risk perception and moral disengagement, there are great potential for how 
policymakers can maximise the range of options in dealing with crisis situations. What 
implications could this have on the practice of risk and crisis management? How well would 
morality theory in crisis management gain acceptance? It has been noted that fear of the 
unknown caused a large part of the human crisis and fear of the truth caused a large part of the 
business crisis (Fink 2002). This was posited as a general observation on the Three Mile Island 
crisis. However, it is argued that this is applicable in many crisis scenarios. Should this be the 
case here, what possible practical implications could emerge from morality theory in crisis 
management? Perhaps, future research could help provide useful insight.    
 
8. Conclusion 
 
We have drawn from the risk and moral disengagement literatures to posit that individuals 
susceptible to moral disengagement abuses are not predestined to engage in delinquent 
behaviours. This study contributes to the theoretical understanding of militant behaviour, and 
identified some factors such as environmental victimisation, moralistic punishment, lack of 
social trust, displacement of responsibility and dehumanization that intensify crisis in the 
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context of Niger Delta crisis. The work further deepens our knowledge of moral disengagement 
implications in crisis response and the mitigating circumstances – perhaps research in this area 
would continue to grow and shape the current approach in managing crises and disasters. The 
potential of morality analysis of crisis management is much needed in sustainable crisis 
management given the complexity and dimension issues that are present in such events. 
However, the nature of crisis should determine crisis management efforts in dealing with such 
crisis. Moral disengagement sometimes seems to threaten our very essence of humanity (Chugh 
et al. 2014) therefore attachment of morality and perception with practical implications are 
partially offered as areas to strengthen and improve risk and crisis management practice. This 
can be achieved through open and honest engagement in environmental issues affecting the 
vulnerable environment and vulnerable people in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. In 
conclusion, evidence from this study indicates that artisanal local refinery, environmental 
victimisation, moralistic punishment, and moral surveillance are central factors which leaders 
must address in the Niger Delta crisis. This can be achieved through risk and crisis management 
training for leaders responsible for the management of the Niger Delta crisis and local 
communities’ leaders 
We did not claim to have offered a comprehensive viewpoint of how vandals and militants 
justified their inhumane conducts but rather provide detailed empirical evidence of how risk 
perception and moral disengagement influence vandalism and militancy. This is particularly 
true because the subject of the research context, analyses and discussions are limited to 
environmental disasters, militancy (terrorism) and vandalism in Nigeria. This is different from 
natural hazards and technological hazards. However, lessons may be learned from the research 
findings which can serve as precursor to the management of other types of mass emergencies 
and disasters (e.g. technological hazards, product recalls, sabotage, insurgency, jihadist, and 
suicide bombers, and terrorism) because of the behavioural components involved in them. The 
research revealed how vandals, militants, and crisis responders can cognitively redefine 
inhumane crisis responses.  
What was clear from this research context is that common problems such are environmental 
degradation and disasters are constantly redefine in different forms, this is what is breeding 
alternative and opposing behaviours in their management. The nature of hazards 
(environmental disasters, vandalism, and militancy) addressed could help understand, for 
example, reactions to climate change, and natural hazards such as flooding. This is because 
there are clear uniformities in terms of how crisis leaders and local people respond to the 
debates surrounding natural hazards (and climate change consequences). Finally, the relative 
sample of this research and limitation to the Niger Delta region of Nigeria – thus provide 
insufficient argument to claim that the ideas presented are widely generalizable. Nevertheless, 
the implications of the research concepts and findings for crisis and disaster management 
practice are clear. The research models are silent on how gender disparity can complicate risk 
perception and moral evaluation but future research should consider this when discussing the 
research findings. It is also hope that research in this area will continue to grow and identify 
additional factors and strategies that are imperative when managing cases of disasters and mass 
emergencies. 
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Notes 
 
1We thank the reviewers for pointing out the need to address the salient concepts related to this 
research and the editor-in-chief for alerting us to introduce these concepts to those unfamiliar 
with them. It is hope that these would stir the debates relating to understanding of vandalism 
and militancy (terrorism) in the context of risk perception and moral disengagement. These 
concepts are even critical to sustainable crisis and disaster management practice especially in 
the context of behavioural related crises and disasters such as terrorism, technological hazards, 
natural hazards and climate change. 
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